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Abstract
We propose a continuum model for the description of buyer and seller dynamics in
an Internet market. The relevant variables are the research effort of buyers and the
sellers’ reputation building process. We show that, if a commercial web-site gives
consumers the possibility to rate credibly sellers they bargained with, vendors are
forced to be more honest. This leads to mutual beneficial symbiosis between buyers
and sellers; the overall enhanced volume of transactions contributes ultimately to
the web-site, which facilitates the matchmaking service.
Key words: Asymmetric Information; Internet Commerce; Game theory;
Self-organization; Symbiosis.
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1 The Problem
The Internet provides a new venue for commercial transactions, though there is
still no consensus as to what fundamental mechanism makes a commercial web
site tick or flop. In the law of supply and demand, transactions are beneficial
to both buyers and sellers in general. However, so-called market failures can
happen if the information about the quality of the product is very asymmetric.
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In the last few decades economists have made fundamental research work in
this area —for instance the famous paper by George Akerlof on the ”Lemon’s
Problem” [1] as well as more general applications of asymmetric information
in many economic relationships by Joe Stiglitz et al.; for a recent review see
[2].
What is special about Internet commerce? In the last few years the much ini-
tial enthusiasm turned into big disappointment, after many high flyers crashed
and the Internet commerce bubble blowed. We feel that the fundamental mech-
anism is not yet generally appreciate. In this paper we want to highlight the
unique role played by the reputation system. In the Internet commerce, the
information asymmetry is extreme: buyers cannot evaluate the quality of prod-
ucts before purchasing them. Even worse, buyers don’t even see sellers in their
face, as in an off-line transaction. Thus the information asymmetry is much
more severe than in the traditional commerce modes. The Internet, on the
other hand, offers tremendous opportunities, since buyers can access a vast
choice of products and the search costs are much reduced.
So, we face the dilemma: how to tap into the huge potential while avoiding the
proverbial information asymmetry? Our analysis will show that the holy grail
rests in binding the collective knowledge of all buyers about the sellers’ reputa-
tion. The Internet commerce has the unprecedented potential to leverage the
collective buying experience in a centralized place. Though a less than honest
seller can get away with a questionable transaction on one buyer, the dissat-
isfied buyer can easily post his rating on this particular seller. Reputation is
a valuable asset that no vendor can ignore. Indeed, most of the fast growing
e-commerce web sites, including Internet auctions sites such as eBay [3], allow
buyers to rate sellers after receiving the product they bid for. The ensemble
of those ratings builds up a seller’s reputation that can be viewed ever since
by other buyers, thus replacing (and sometimes improving) the direct quality
check of usual street shopping.
Our analysis is based on the fundamental conviction that sellers have the
option of being honest or not. If the web site can establish a credible rating
system to capture buyers’ feedback, it effectively filters out dishonest sellers.
There are no permanent cheaters, they must find other ways to make a living
that are also beneficial to the society. The matchmaking service, provided by
the web-site, facilitates a selection process that is the opposite of ”adverse
selection” [4]. Those sellers with good quality, would be encourage to join by
a honest representation, while the dishonest ones wouldn’t even want to try.
Such a service can be easily rewarded, since such a web-site can take a slice
from the mutually beneficial transactions. Our results show that the extent of
the total transactions depends on the quality of the feedback rating system.
Our approach is to model buyers and sellers as two species in symbiosis, much
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like in population dynamics. In fact, our equations share many similarities
with the well-known Lotka-Volterra model [5,6]. The key is to realize the two
species have both converging as well as diverging interests: Buyers need sellers,
the more the better, and vice versa. This much they have converging interests.
But, in a particular transaction, a buyer’s loss is the seller’s gain. However,
on the aggregate level transactions between the two groups are non-zero sum
games —in fact positive sum games.
2 The Model
At time t, B(t) potential buyers and S(t) sellers meet in our virtual market-
place. Buyers’ rationality is bounded by incomplete information and limited
computing capability, but we retain the assumption of procedural rationality
[7]. This means agents only dispose of a few options, but they are able to
choose better ones with higher probability, provided they are given correct
information. We shall consider a fast growing regime, assuming the number of
buyers B(t) grows exponentially in time. Regular users may decide to continue
trading or stop doing so, according to their satisfaction at previous times.
The interest a given seller has in staying on that market can be easily estimated
as a function of the earnings made. If he gained nothing, it is very probable
that he won’t repeat the experience. Sometimes he may lower his honesty
in the hope to make more money, or increase it in order to sell more. On
the other hand, buyers’ profitability has to be inferred. Neglecting possible
technical dysfunctions, delivery failures and other inconvenients not directly
related to the actors of the transaction, there are two main possible sources of
discontent: the item could differ from what the buyer was originally looking
for, or its state of usage could be worse than he was promised. If a buyer is
not satisfied, he is not likely to visit the web-site again in the near future.
Each seller s only sells products of a kind (xs) and is characterized by his
honesty hs, which can be interpreted as the ratio quality/price he is selling at.
His satisfaction γs(t) is defined as the number of products sold ns(t), times
the normalized unitary gain ghs:
γs(t)=ns(t)ghs (1)
ghs =1− hs +m, (2)
where m is the minimum profit margin, i.e. a percentage of the price that
covers all expenses and leaves a revenue even to the most honest vendors. Here
1− hs can be regarded as an extra-profit that would equal zero in a perfectly
competitive market. We assume no price discrimination on an individual basis,
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i.e. hs does not depend on the particular buyer s is dealing with, even though
this phenomenon may arise in particular contests [8].
Each buyer b looks, at time t, for a specifically desired product xb. Products
xk, be they desired or sold, can be represented as elements of a metric space
(real numbers or bit strings), where we can define a normalized distance db,s =
d(xb, xs) ∈ [0, 1) and an overlap qb,s = 1− db,s. The latter measures how close
a product xs is to the buyer’s desire xb. Now, if b buys a unit of xs˜, once he
receives it he is rewarded with a payoff rb,s˜. His satisfaction γb(t) then equals:
γb(t) =


rb,s˜ if b purchased xs˜ at time t;
0 if b purchased nothing at time t;
(3)
It is reasonable that rb,s be an increasing function of hs (buyers are more
satisfied if the purchased product has a better ratio quality/price) and qb,s
(buyers are more satisfied if the purchased product is closer to their wishes).
Hence we define
rb,s = hsqb,s. (4)
Finally, buyer b can rate seller’s s honesty and influence his reputation. This
happens for every buyer who deals with seller s at each time step, therefore
one’s reputation tends to his honesty hs. Buyers, then, can take a look at sell-
ers’ reputation before purchasing a product. Whenever a difference between
reputation and honesty is not explicitly mentioned, we shall assume they co-
incide. On the other hand, buyers are allowed to trust it or not, in a way we
will describe later on.
Now we have a definition of buyers’ and sellers’ satisfaction. Their role becomes
clear once we specify the dynamics: we will do that first, leaving the details of
the transaction process for later sections. Since we are aiming to give a mean
field description of the system, it is useful to introduce the average buyers’
and sellers’ satisfactions
ΓB(t) =
∑
b
γb(t)/B(t) (5)
ΓS(t) =
∑
s
γs(t)/S(t). (6)
When the number of buyers and sellers becomes large, the self-averaging effect
yields
∑
ζ γζ(t) ≃
∑
ζ γ¯ζ(t), with ζ = b, s. Here the overline bar is an average
over realizations: γ¯ζ(t) represents the average payoff an agent would get if he
faced the same situation a great number of times. Let us assume h is a discrete
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variable which can only take H values, separated by a mesh ∆h = 1/(H − 1).
Then we can consider the number of sellers Sh(t) belonging to a certain honesty
class, with S(t) =
∑1
h=0 Sh(t). Their average satisfaction will be
ΓSh(t) =
∑
s:hs=h
γs(t)/Sh(t), with: (7)
ΓS(t) =
∑
h
Sh(t)ΓSh(t)/S(t) = 〈ΓSh(t)〉. (8)
Here and in the following, angular brackets stand for averages over the honesty
distribution
p(h, t) = Sh(t)/S(t). (9)
Notice that, while ΓB(t) is constrained in the range [0, 1], the value of ΓSh is
only bounded by (m+ 1)B(t). Now we are able to write H + 1 replicator dy-
namics type [9] differential equations, describing the mean field time evolution
of B(t) and Sh(t), for h = 0,∆h, 2∆h, ..., 1:
dB(t)
dt
= cBB(t)− [1− ΓB(t)]B(t) (10)
dSh(t)
dt
=∆h[ΓS(t)− 1]S(t) + [ΓSh(t)− 1]Sh(t). (11)
Here the parameter cB is a factor of growth, which embeds all the external
conditions, such as liquidity and competition effects. Summing equation (11)
over h we obtain
dS(t)
dt
= 2[ΓS(t)− 1]S(t). (12)
The above equations arise from the following dynamics. At time t every buyer
attracts cB users in the web-site. Among the old clients a percentage ΓB ∈ [0, 1]
survives, while the others leave. In other words, the probability that an active
buyer continues shopping in this market at future times is proportional to his
satisfaction at time t. As for sellers, the term ∆h[ΓS(t)−1]S(t) on the r.h.s. of
equation (11) acts uniformly on every h level. Since ΓS(t) is the average profit
a seller made at time t, it represents a general measure of profitability for the
web-site. If it is bigger than a given value, which we arbitrarily posit equal to
one, new sellers are likely to add listings to the web-site. We can think they
are people who only look at aggregate results before entering a market, non
professional vendors drawn from a uniform honesty distribution. If ΓS < 1
some of these persons will drop out, with the understanding that Sh(t) be set
to zero if it falls below it. The second term [ΓSh(t)− 1]Sh(t) of equation (11)
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is strongly h-dependent. When it is smaller than one, a percentage 1 − ΓSh
of sellers of honesty h drops out, vice-versa when ΓSh > 1. In this case the
newcomers are fairly well informed about the market dynamics and estimate
how much extra-profit they can make, thus choosing a specific entry honesty
level. Notice that the honesty hs of a given active seller cannot be changed in
time, but s can always exit and come back with a more profitable one.
The functions Γ depend on the probability distribution µ(q) of the overlap,
arising from the choice of the metric space of products, and on the amount of
information buyers collect before purchasing an item. In the following sections
we shall analyze two particular cases. First we shall model consumers going
for one specific product (maximal selection); then flexible ones, looking for a
product similar “enough” to their wishes (browsing agents).
3 Maximal selection
Here we analyze a process where potential consumers decide whether to buy
or not a single particular item per time unit. As we already mentioned, a buyer
b access the web-site looking for a desired product xb. Now he considers what
is available in the market, picks the item that fits best his request, decides
whether to buy it or not, and finally he may receive and judge it. Let us
assume that, thanks to internal search tools of the web-site, he finds the item
xsˆb corresponding to the maximum overlap qb,sˆb = maxs qb,s. Then he evaluates
it, checking the seller’s reputation, and decides if he wants to buy it or not,
with no further research. He purchases it with probability fb(sˆb), proportional
to the buyer’s expected reward. The latter can differ from the actual payoff
ri,sˆb (4) he would eventually get from the purchase. In fact, at this stage, the
buyer does not have the product xsˆb in his hands and can only guess upon
the available information. He could, therefore, trust differently his perception
of hs and qb,s, the first one coming from other buyers’ ratings of seller sˆb, the
second from a description (sometimes a picture) of the item, provided by the
seller himself. Hence we define
fb(s) = h
α
s qb,s, (13)
where the exponent α is a parameter that tunes the weight consumers give to
sellers’ reputation. If he decides to buy, b eventually receives the product, rates
seller sˆb with hsˆb and is rewarded with a payoff rb,sˆb. The average satisfaction
then equals
ΓB(t) =
1
B(t)
∑
b
fb(sˆb)rb,sˆb =
1
B(t)
∑
b
hα+1sˆb q
2
b,sˆb
. (14)
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When we take the average over all buyers, we are implicitly averaging over the
honesty distribution p(h, t) (9), because the index sˆb depends on the chosen
seller. Let us approximate qb,sˆb with its average value over all buyers qmax;
then
ΓB(t) = 〈h
α+1〉q2max. (15)
Every seller has equal probability to maximize the overlap of a given buyer.
Conversely their probability to sell a product once chosen, and their unitary
profit, depend on their honesty level. The average profit made by a seller of
honesty h then reads
ΓSh(t) =Nh(t)gh
= hαqmax
B(t)
S(t)
(1− h+m), (16)
where Nh(t) =
∑
s:hs=h ns(t)/Sh(t) is the average number of items sold by
a seller of honesty h. According to definition (8), the aggregate satisfaction
arising from (16) reads:
ΓS(t) =
B(t)
S(t)
[
(1 +m)〈hα〉 − 〈hα+1〉
]
. (17)
It is worth noticing the strong feedback effect contained in it: if S(t) becomes
much larger than B(t), then ΓS(t) diminishes, thus slowing down the growing
rate of S(t) itself. As a consequence a stationary state is reached when B(t) and
S(t) grow exponentially with the same exponent, which is entirely determined
by limt→∞ ΓB(t) = ΓB. An example is given in figure 1.
In the limit of large S we can employ the following approximation:
qmax∫
0
µ(q)dq ≃ 1−
1
S(t) + 1
, (18)
where µ(q) is the overlap distribution. Equation (18) becomes exact if µ(q) is
uniform. Let us assume, for the sake of simplicity, that products xs are real
numbers uniformly distributed between zero and one. A natural definition of
the distance between two products, on the torus [0, 1], is
db,s = min(|xb − xs|, 1− |xb − xs|), (19)
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which yields the following overlap distribution:
µ(q) = 2Θ(q − 0.5), (20)
where Θ is the Heaviside function. Equation (18) then gives
qmax =
2S(t) + 1
2(S(t) + 1)
. (21)
We solved numerically equations (10) and (11), with definition (15) for buyers’
satisfaction and definition (16), in the approximation (21), for that of sellers.
Positing a uniform distribution at time zero, we focused on the honesty distri-
bution of sellers in the stationary regime p(h) = limt→∞ p(h, t). Since p(h, t)
(9) results from a natural selection of sellers as a consequence of buyers’ be-
havior, honesties appearing with greater probability reflect higher earnings
realized by the corresponding sellers. The lower graph of figure 2 shows a shift
of distribution p(h) towards a greater average honesty 〈h〉, as the value of α is
increased. In our model α is the relevant parameter: the larger it is, the more
buyers take sellers’ reputation into account. In fact the probability fb(sˆb) (13)
that buyer b actually purchases product xsˆb , decreases for greater α. Such a
decrease is not uniform in h, but scales as a power law. As a result, with
increasing α sellers with higher honesty are more favored, their relative fre-
quency is enhanced and so is buyer’s probability of purchase. The net result of
these two competing effects is a greater buyers’ satisfaction, in the stationary
state, when α is bigger. This appears clearly in figure 3, where the average
honesty 〈h〉 (upper graph) and the buyers’ satisfaction ΓB (lower graph) are
shown to be increasing functions of α. As already mentioned, ΓB determines
the slope of both buyers and sellers exponential growth. We conclude that
a greater α exerts more selective pressure on sellers, giving rise to a more
efficient market and to a faster growth of the web-site usage.
4 Browsing agents
If, instead of considering only the product that maximizes his overlap, a buyer
also looks at other offers, he might find better deals. To make things clear,
imagine a parameter ρ ∈ (0, 0.5] tunes the width of customers’ search for
goods. Among the S items available in the market, buyer b examines the ones
(2S(t)ρ on average) closer than ρ to his desired one, i.e. those that fulfill the
condition db,s < ρ. This mimics a situation where buyers browse the portion of
the web-site containing products they might be interested in. This task is made
easy by the division of products into categories, provided by most portals, and
by the possibility to display first the ones sold by more reputable sellers. Buyer
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b can thus operate a quick selection, after which he picks only one product s,
with probability zb(s), and analyzes it more closely. In the preceding section we
analyzed the case ρ→ 0, where zb(s) becomes a Dirac delta function centered
in xsˆb . We want to approach here the opposite limit, that of agents performing
a wide search before evaluating something for purchase.
Once he has chosen an item xs˜, buyer b proceeds as before: he purchases it with
probability fb(s˜) (13), and is eventually rewarded with rb,s˜ (4). The average
buyers’ satisfaction over all transactions taking place at time t, namely ΓB(t),
then reads
ΓB(t) =
1
B(t)
∑
b
∑
s:db,s<ρ
zb(s)fb(s)rb,s. (22)
It is sensible to define zb(s) as a monotonically increasing function of fb(s).
This means the probability of choosing a certain product for evaluation, is
proportional to the probability of actually buying it afterwards. This is jus-
tified as long as items in the web-site are well organized and sorted. In order
to be consistent with such an assumption, the exact functional form of zb(s)
must somehow compensate the density of products available within a given
portion of the space. If products are real numbers uniformly distributed in the
domain [0, 1] and we adopt definition (19) for the distance, then µ(q) is flat
and we can simply set a linear dependence:
zb(s) =
fb(s)∑
s:db,s<ρ fb(s)
. (23)
Let us define the conditional probability µ(qb,s|xb) that a buyer b has overlap
qb,s with seller s, given his desire xb. Inserting equation (23) in (22), and
employing definitions (4) and (13), we obtain:
ΓB(t) =
1
B(t)
∑
b
∑
s:db,s<ρ h
2α+1
s q
3
b,s∑
s:db,s<ρ h
α
s qb,s
→
〈h2α+1〉
〈hα〉
1∫
0
dx
∫ 1
0 dqµ(q|x)q
3Θ(q − ρ˜)∫ 1
0 dqµ(q|x)qΘ(q − ρ˜)
, (24)
where ρ˜ = 1 − ρ and the arrow stands for the limit of large S and B, and
for ρ ≫ 1/S. Similarly we can compute the average profit made by a seller
belonging to a certain honesty level h:
ΓSh(t) =
gh
Sh(t)
∑
b
∑
s:[db,s<ρ
⋂
hs=h] h
2α
s q
2
b,s∑
s:db,s<ρ h
α
s qb,s
9
→ gh
B(t)
S(t)
h2α
〈hα〉
1∫
0
dx
∫ 1
0 dqµ(q|x)q
2Θ(q − ρ˜)∫ 1
0 dqµ(q|x)qΘ(q − ρ˜)
, (25)
where gh is defined in (2). Here the limit is taken as in (24), with the additional
condition ρ≫ 1/Sh for every h.
It is easy to compute the conditional probability µ(qb,s|xb). With definition
(19) of the distance we obtain, in the continuous limit:
µ(q|x) =
1∫
0
dyδ(q −max[|x− y|, 1− |x− y|]) = 2Θ(q − 0.5).
Equations (24) and (25) become:
ΓB(t) =
1 + ρ˜2
2
〈h2α+1〉
〈hα〉
(26)
ΓSh(t) =
1− ρ˜3
1− ρ˜2
2B(t)
3S(t)
h2α
〈hα〉
(1− h +m) (27)
ΓS(t) =
1− ρ˜3
1− ρ˜2
2B(t)
3S(t)
1
〈hα〉
[
(1 +m)〈h2α〉 − 〈h2α+1〉
]
. (28)
We solved numerically equations (10) and (11) with the above definitions of
the Γ-s and with a uniform initial honesty distribution of sellers. In the upper
graphs of figures 2 and 4 we show the α and m-dependence of the stable
honesty distribution p(h) for browsing agents. The lower graphs of these figures
show, as a comparison, simulations with maximal selection. For any given set
of the parameters, browsing buyers force sellers to be more honest than q-
maximizing ones. This is also shown in the upper graph of figure 3, where the
α-dependence of average honesty is displayed. Now we can ask ourselves if
also the web-site usage grows more with browsing agents than in the maximal
selection case. In the lower graph of figure 3 the stationary buyers’ average
satisfaction ΓB, which governs the slope of the exponential growth of B(t) and
S(t), is plotted against α. Up to α ≃ 7.5 we certainly have a faster growth
with browsing agents. A typical snapshot of this situation is given in figure
5, where the stationary honesty distribution and the time growth of B(t) are
shown in the two cases. For greater values of α the average honesty approaches
a plateau, and so does ΓB. This limit is rather unrealistic: the overlap q plays
nearly no role in the decision of purchase, being dominated by hα. It becomes,
therefore, more profitable to adopt the maximal selection strategy. We should
also stress that, in a competitive market, a higher average honesty of sellers
would improve the overall web-site reputation, thus increasing the value of
cB and, consequently, the growth rate of B(t). We will, nevertheless, neglect
10
this effect. Finally, figure 6 shows that ΓB grows with ρ —and so does ΓS.
This confirms the Marriage Problem instance [10]: increased information, even
restricted to one side (in our case that of buyers), is beneficial to the whole
society.
5 Dynamical equilibrium
It is useful to reformulate the dynamics, i.e. eqs. (10), (11) and (12), in terms
of variables
σ(h, t) = p(h, t)/∆h (29)
η(t) =B(t)/S(t), (30)
whose time derivatives read:
σ˙(h, t) = (ΓS(t)− 1) + σ(h, t)[ΓSh(t)− 2ΓS(t) + 1] (31)
η˙(t) = η(t)[ΓB(t)− 2ΓS(t) + 1 + cB]. (32)
These variables eventually reach a constant value, due to the equilibration
of two sets of competing effects. First, that of sellers’ honesty: a greater h
level enhances the probability of selling a product (see (13)), but reduces the
unitary gain gh = 1 + m − h (2). Second, that of the ratio buyers/sellers: a
bigger η(t) means there are more buyers for each seller. This increases the
average sellers’ satisfaction ΓS(t), which in turn makes S(t) increase, and η(t)
diminish. The stationarity condition yields:
ΓB + cB − 1 = 2(ΓS − 1) (33)
σ(h) =
(ΓS − 1)
2ΓS − ΓSh − 1
, (34)
from which it is clear that the inequality ΓB > 1 − cB must hold to ensure
growth. Equation (34) is the result of our darwinian-type selection, which im-
plies that the most frequent h-population be the most fit (satisfied). From
equation (16) (resp. (27)) we can compute the mode hMSm (resp. h
BA
m ) of dis-
tribution p(h):
hMSm =
(1 +m)α
1 + α
(35)
hBAm =
2(1 +m)α
1 + 2α
. (36)
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When the mode equals one, fully honest sellers have an advantage over the
others. If that happens for a given set of parameters (m,α), agents’ satisfaction
approaches a limit value. In figure 3 this is shown, in particular, for the α-
dependence of ΓB. Equations (35) and (36) explain why the plateau value is
reached faster with browsing agents.
In order to find the stationary honesty distribution, we should solve equation
(33) for η and substitute the result into (34). For the case of browsing agents,
by inserting expressions (26), (27) and (28) in equations (33) and (34), we
obtain:
η=
(cB + 1)〈h
α〉+ a1〈h
2α+1〉
2a2〈uα(h)〉
(37)
σ(h) =
{
1 +
[
1−
uα(h)
〈uα(h)〉
]
vα
}
−1
, (38)
where a1 =
1+ρ˜2
2
, a2 =
2(1−ρ˜3)
3(1−ρ˜2)
and
uα(h) =h
2α(1 +m)− h2α+1
vα=
[
1−
〈hα〉
a2η〈uα(h)〉
]
−1
= 1 +
2〈hα〉
a1〈h2α+1〉+ (cB − 1)〈hα〉
.
Now equation (38) can be solved self-consistently.
Similarly, for the case of maximal selection, we insert equations (15), (16) and
(17) into (33), we eliminate η and substitute the expressions thus obtained in
(34). Finally we end up with the following equation:
[
(〈hα+1〉+ cB + 1)
(
1−
u˜α(h)
2〈u˜α(h)〉
)
− 1
]
σ(h) =
〈hα+1〉+ cB − 1
2
, (39)
where u˜α(h) is given by
u˜α(h) = h
α(1 +m)− hα+1. (40)
The above relation (39) can be also solved self-consistently. An example is
given in figure 7, where the theoretical stationary distribution arising from
(39) is shown to match exactly the one found solving numerically the original
time dependent differential equations, (10) and (11), with the same set of
parameters. All other stationary quantities can be calculated accordingly.
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6 Honesty vs Reputation
In the preceding sections we assumed reputation equals honesty. The two
could, in fact, differ for the following main reasons. The first source of problem
relies in imprecise consumers’ ratings, but it is the minor one if the volume
of affairs is big, since mistakes have no preferential direction. Moreover ∆h
can be chosen of the same order of magnitude as the variance of individual
mistakes, thus identifying h with the consumers’ average judgment. Second
comes cheating, that is a seller, who has so far been good, might occasionally
sell at an higher price. This could temporarily improve the gain of some seller,
but it should only affect the variance and not the average satisfaction of buyers
in the stationary regime. Thirdly, the reputation building process could be very
inaccurate. We shall concentrate on the latter because it seems to be the main
shortcoming of some commercial web-sites existing today.
Let us consider the extreme case, although common, where the rating form
available in the web-site allows buyers to state if they made a good bargain
or not, with no further specification. As a result, reputation consists in being
good (hg) or bad (hb), and this is the only information about sellers buyers are
provided with. Once they purchased a product, though, buyers can evaluate it
accurately and judge it according to their proper honesty scale. Therefore the
“true” honesty level h still plays the same role here as in equation (4), whereas
elsewhere it must be substituted by h˜, the two levels reputation. Equations
(26), (27) and (28) then become:
ΓB(t) =
1 + ρ˜2
2
〈hh˜2α〉
〈h˜α〉
(41)
ΓSh(t) =
1− ρ˜3
1− ρ˜2
2B(t)
3S(t)
h˜2α
〈h˜α〉
(1− h +m) (42)
ΓS(t) =
1− ρ˜3
1− ρ˜2
2B(t)
3S(t)〈h˜α〉
[
(1 +m)〈h˜2α〉 − 〈hh˜2α〉
]
, (43)
where h˜ = hg if h ≥ 1/2 and h˜ = hb if h < 1/2.
In this situation sellers less honest than 0.5 tend to die out. For the higher
intrinsic honesty levels, those who are closer to 0.5 are favored, and p(h)
decays exponentially toward h = 1. This defect of information transmission,
something like a narrow channel effect [11], damages severely the web-site
usage. In fig. 8 we plotted the time evolution of B(t) in this binary case, with
hg = 1 − ∆h and hb = ∆h, together with the case of browsing agents with
perfect judging forms at their disposal. It is clear that the latter case shows a
much faster growth.
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7 Comments
We have shown, within our model, that a good rating form can help the growth
of a commercial web-site, overcoming the problem of asymmetrical informa-
tion. But, how is buyers’ browsing ability influenced by its architecture? A
good categorization of products is, of course, important: this way we would
probably approach the most profitable region of figure 3. We believe a major
step forward would be achieved once it will be possible to guess accurately
buyers’ future wishes [12,13].
The equations we studied, i.e. (10) and (11), can be regarded as mean-field
approximations to a stochastic behavior. We suppose, on average, an expo-
nential growth of the web-site usage: this might mimic a fast growing stage
of e-commerce web-sites. We believe the role of honesty and information we
tried to stylize here applies to any situation where a great number of sellers is
easily reachable to any buyer.
Our calculations are carried out by identifying buyers and sellers with real
numbers: this is a useful simplification, but it is easy to substitute them with
bit strings. In this case the distance (19) becomes the hemming distance, and
probability (23) should be redefined appropriately.
Full information and unlimited processing capability of buyers could, in princi-
ple, allow them to maximize directly the product hq. Let us imagine each buyer
b follows the maximal selection strategy, with sˆb = [sˆ : hsˆqb,sˆ = maxs hsqb,s].
This would favor so much honest sellers that the honesty distribution p(h)
would become a delta function centered in h = 1, which corresponds to a
perfectly efficient market.
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Fig. 1. Buyers (bold lines) and sellers growth as a function of time, with maximal
selection.
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Fig. 2. Stationary honesty distribution of sellers with maximal selection (lower
graph) and browsing agents with ρ = 0.5 (upper graph). Different line-styles corre-
spond to different values of α: the legend refers to both graphs. We fixed H = 100,
m = 0.1 and cB = 0.9. Normalization of p(h) is set to 100.
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Fig. 3. Upper graph: average honesty of sellers, in the stationary state, as a function
of α. Lower graph: average buyers’ satisfaction ΓB , in the stationary state, as a
function of α. We fixed H = 100, m = 0.1 and cB = 0.9. The logarithmic x-axis
scale is the same for both graphs.
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Fig. 4. Stationary honesty distribution of sellers with maximal selection (lower
graph) and browsing agents with ρ = 0.5 (upper graph). Different line-styles corre-
spond to different values of the profit margin m: the legend refers to both graphs.
We fixed H = 100, α = 0.5 and cB = 0.9. Normalization of p(h) is set to 100.
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Fig. 5. Buyers’ time evolution (lower graph) and stable honesty distribution of
sellers (upper graph). Solid lines are browsing angents simulations with ρ = 0.5,
while dashed ones are with maximal selection. In both cases we fixed H = 100,
m = 0.1 and α = 1.
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Fig. 6. Average buyers’ satisfaction ΓB for browsing agents, in the stationary state,
as a function of ρ. We fixed H = 100, m = 0.1, cB = 0.9 and α = 1.5.
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Fig. 7. Honesty distribution of sellers with maximal selection. Circles are numerical
simulations, the solid line comes from equation (39). The parameters are: H = 100,
cB = 0.1, α = 1.5 and m = 0.1.
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Fig. 8. Buyers growth as a function of time for browsing agents. The dashed line
represent the case h˜ = h, the solid line the binary case h˜ = hg, hb. The parameters
are: H = 100, cB = 1.5, α = 1 and m = 0.1, in both cases.
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